Lessons from a single jurisdiction with two governments: Governments and the initiation of law reform in England and Wales by Percival, R.
This is a repository copy of Lessons from a single jurisdiction with two governments: 
Governments and the initiation of law reform in England and Wales.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/141494/
Version: Accepted Version
Article:
Percival, R. (2018) Lessons from a single jurisdiction with two governments: Governments 
and the initiation of law reform in England and Wales. European Journal of Law Reform, 
21 (1). ISSN 1387-2370 
© 2019 The Author. This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently published 
in European Journal of Law Reform. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's 
self-archiving policy.
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
Lessons from a single jurisdiction with two governments  
Governments and the initiation of law reform in England and Wales1 
 
Richard Percival2 
 
Abstract 
This article sets out the centrality of government to the initiation of law reform in respect of 
the (England and Wales) Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission (and by 
extension, those law reform agencies based on the British model), and then considers in the 
light of recent experience how the existing approach works in the unique context of a single 
jurisdiction ± England and Wales ± which now has two governments ± the UK Government for 
England, and the devolved Welsh Government. Having identified shortcomings, the article 
makes suggestions for improved institutional arrangements to meet the particular law reform 
needs of Wales.  
 
Keywords Law reform, UK devolution, law reform agencies, relations with governments, 
reform proposals 
 
This article considers recent developments in the relationship between the UK and Welsh 
Governments and the Law Commission (that is, the Law Commission relating to the 
jurisdiction of England and Wales). It relies in significant measure on the experience and 
knowledge of the author, a member of the staff of the Commission from 1998 to 2015. From 
2001, I was the team manager of the Public Law Team, which undertook virtually all of the 
law reform projects in devolved areas. This included responsibility for the Wales-only projects 
initiated in 2011, discussed below. I was also formally charged with oversight of the 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKH:HOVKGHYROYHGLQVWLWXWLRQVIt is hoped that, as a result, 
the article may provide both information and insights unavailable through published sources 
alone.  
The discussion starts with the centrality of government to the initiation of law reform in Britain, 
and in many common law/Commonwealth jurisdictions; and then asks the question ± what 
happens with the initiation process when you have two governments, as is the case in England 
DQG:DOHVXQGHUWKH8.¶VRGG, asymmetric form of devolution?  
The focus of the inquiry is, in the first instance, on the mechanics of law reform initiation. 
However, in this context, issues with initiation of law reform are also key to the success of the 
law reform process as a whole. The article closes with some consideration of how the 
                                                          
1 An earlier form of this paper was presented at the third IALS Law Reform Project workshop on 1 November 
2017. 
2 Richard Percival is Professor of Criminal Law and Practice (law reform) at Sheffield University, UK.  
institutional architecture of law reform in England and Wales can be improved to ensure that 
the law reform needs of Wales are fully addressed.  
Government plays a key role in the initiation of law reform projects. This role is set out for the 
two GB agencies in the Law Commissions Act 1965. Further, this model has been influential 
throughout the common law world wherever law reform agencies have been established, so it 
is not merely of parochial UK interest.  
 The scheme of the Law Commissions Act 1965 essentially gave the UK Government either 
positive control, or a negative veto, over the agenda of the Commissions.  
Section 3 of the Act, and in particular subsection (1), sets out the duties of the Commission. 
The drafting is not of the clearest. But the key to how initiation of law reform works is section 
3, and in particular the list set out in section 3(1). The provision reads as follows, as variously 
amended: 
(1) It shall be the duty of each of the Commissions to take and keep under review 
all the law with which they are respectively concerned with a view to its systematic 
development and reform, including in particular the codification of such law, the 
elimination of anomalies, the repeal of obsolete and unnecessary enactments, the 
reduction of the number of separate enactments and generally the simplification 
and modernisation of the law, and for that purpose² 
(a) to receive and consider any proposals for the reform of the law which may be 
made or 
referred to them; 
(b) to prepare and submit to the Minister from time to time programmes for the 
examination of different branches of the law with a view to reform, including 
recommendations as to the agency (whether the Commission or another body) by 
which any such examination should be carried out; 
(c) to undertake, pursuant to any such recommendations approved by the 
Minister, the examination of particular branches of the law and the formulation, 
by means of draft Bills or otherwise, of proposals for reform therein; 
(d) to prepare from time to time at the request of the Minister comprehensive 
programmes 
of consolidation and statute law revision, and to undertake the preparation of draft 
Bills pursuant to any such programme approved by the Minister; 
(e) to provide advice and information to government departments and other 
authorities or bodies concerned at the instance of the Government of the United 
Kingdom or the Scottish Administration with proposals for the reform or 
amendment of any branch of the law; 
(ea) in the case of the Law Commission, to provide advice and information to the 
Welsh Ministers; 
(f) to obtain such information as to the legal systems of other countries as appears 
to the Commissioners likely to facilitate the performance of any of their 
functions. 
 
The way that the list of specific duties of the Commission in (a) to (f) has been interpreted 
creates two ways in which a law reform project is to be adopted by the Commission. Section 
3(1)(b) provides for the Commissions to submit to the Minister ± the Lord Chancellor, for the 
England and Wales Commission, Scottish Ministers in Scotland ± a programme; and, by (c), 
for the Commission to undertake a project approved by the minister as part of a programme. 
By subsection (1)(e), the Commissions may ³SURYLGHDGYLFHDQGLQIRUPDWLRQWRJRYHUQPHQW
GHSDUWPHQWV´   
The practice of the Law Commission, therefore, is that a project comes either under a 
programme of law reform, or it is provided directly to a government department. In the case of 
the latter, the Commissions have interpreted the provision to mean that, for a project to be 
initiated under subsection (1)(e), it must be requested by the relevant government department. 
This approach may owe something to the difficulty in construing 3(1)(e) ± in particular, it is 
SRVVLEOHWRUHDGWKH³DWWKHLQVWDQFHRIWKH*RYHUQPHQW´DVUHODWLQJWRWKHSURYLVLRQRIDGYLFH
and information to departments, as well as to other bodies concerned with proposing law 
reform. This is wrong. What has to be at the instance of the government is the concerning of 
the other body with law reform. But that it is an easy mistake to make is illustrated by the fact 
that the drafter of the statutory instrument which amended section 3 in the light of the Scotland 
Act 19983 makes exactly this mistake. 
For many years, the Commissions have interpreted (3)(1)(e) as requiring that the advised 
department must request the advice and information ± KHQFHLWVLGHQWLILFDWLRQDVD³UHIHUHQFH´ 
This approach is adopted in the statutory protocol agreed between the Law Commission and 
the UK Government (see below).  
As noted, the GB Commissions provided the basis for what has become the standard model of 
law reform agency throughout the Commonwealth, and more generally in the common law 
world. In nearly all of those agencies, the power of initiation falls to government, although 
sometimes ± as in, for instance, the influential Australian Commonwealth agency ± by 
reference alone.  
The primary concern of this paper is to set out the role of government as a matter of fact, and 
explore the opportunities and problems that has created in England and Wales. But without 
developing the argument, my view is that government control of initiation is right; or at least, 
not wrong, for both principled and instrumental reasons.  
Before turning to devolution, it is worth emphasising that, independently of devolution, recent 
years have seen a re-emphasis on the importance of government buy-in to law reform. In 
particular, in 2009 the 1965 Act was amended to provide for a statutory protocol between the 
government and Law Commission, much of the substance of which is to enforce good practice 
in terms of close and persisting relations with government before during and after a law reform 
project. The amendments also imposed a duty on the Lord Chancellor to report on 
implementation of Law Commission proposals.4  
This was a reaction against, in earlier times, the tendency for the Law Commission to include 
in programmes of law reform projects in which the government did not really have any interest, 
but which it did not veto in the context of a programme. There was a perception that at an 
earlier time, too much latitude was given to incoming commissioners, and indeed Chairs of the 
Commission, to undertake pet projects. It should be emphasised that the push against this came 
                                                          
3 Scotland Act 1998 (Consequential Modifications) (No.2) Order 1999/1820, Sch 2, Part I para 36(3)(a). 
4 Law Commissions Act 1965, ss 3C and 3B. 
largely from the Commission, not from government, although changes to the structure of 
government both made the problem worse and the government more receptive.  
Thus ³WKH JRYHUQPHQW´ LV UHVSRQVLEOH IRU VHWWLQJ RU DSSURYLQJ WKH DJHQGD RI WKH /DZ
Commission. But the introduction of devolution in Great Britain after 1998 made the 
identification of the right government a question, or at least it should have done. 
In relation to Scotland, the position was clear. The Scottish Law Commission was to be 
devolved. Scottish Ministers took over financial responsibility for the Commission, and it 
became Scottish Ministers who were responsible for both programmes and references. This is 
so, despite the fact that generally about a third of Scottish Law Commission projects relate to 
law reserved, by the Scotland Act 1998, to the UK Parliament.  
The same is true in principle for Northern Ireland, although the position is complicated by the 
fact that the (short lived, as it turned out) Commission there was itself a product of the peace 
process, and devolution of justice was delayed.  
In both cases, the devolved country also constituted a separate legal jurisdiction. The case in 
respect of England and Wales is radically different. England and Wales is a single jurisdiction, 
but one with, now, two legislatures. This appears to be unique in the common law world. It 
should be noted that the Welsh devolution settlement has changed substantially a number of 
times since its original inception with the Government of Wales Act 1998. Following 
amendments made to the Government of Wales Act 2006 by the Wales Act 2017, Wales is 
embarking on what is essentially the fourth Welsh devolution settlement WKH³UHVHUYHGSRZHUV
PRGHO´HIIHFWLYHIURP$SULO,t was only with the third settlement, introduced in 2011 
under Part 4 of the Government of Wales Act 2006, that something approaching normal 
legislative functions were accorded to the Welsh Assembly (which will become the Welsh 
Parliament, or Senedd Cymru, before the next elections in 2021). 
The question this position poses is ± if government is central to the initiation of law reform, 
how does that work when one law reform agency, for one jurisdiction, has two governments?  
This was not a question that either the Commission or the governments posed in advance. The 
question has, rather, worked itself out over time in the context of the practice of law reform.  
What did become apparent, in the context of whole-jurisdiction law reform projects that dealt 
with law devolved in Wales was that the lack of an institutional relationship between the Welsh 
devolved bodies and the Law Commission was a problem. Initially, however, the primary locus 
for these issues was consultation on existing projects, rather than initiation. The first result was 
an agreement, adopted in 2008, between the Law Commission and the Welsh Assembly 
Government. The agreement effectively formalised the reasonably effective practical 
arrangements that had been developed by that time. While there was a section in that agreement 
on initiation of projects, its primary focus, and utility, was on other forms of engagement by 
the Welsh Government and other Welsh stakeholders in on-going projects.  
However, particularly with the advent of wider legislative powers under part 4 of the 
Government of Wales Act 2006 in 2011, it became increasingly clear that this voluntary 
approach was unsatisfactory. The result was moves to put the relationship between the Law 
Commission and the Welsh Government on a more formal footing. It is worth noting one 
important personal contribution to the development of the relationship between the 
Commission and the devolved Welsh institutions. In 2012, Lord Lloyd Jones JSC (as he now 
is) took office as the Chair of the Commission. A Welsh language speaking Welshman, who 
had been the presiding High Court judge for Wales, he thoroughly understood the Welsh 
political and legal scenes.  
In November 2012, the Commission agreed to seek an amendment to the 1965 Act to allow the 
Welsh Government to make references on the same basis as government departments. This 
was accepted, and a provision to this effect made its way into the Wales Act 2014, a piece of 
legislation that made moderate adjustments to the devolution settlement, and which fortuitously 
happened to be in the process of drafting at the time. The 1965 Act was amended, avoiding the 
error made in relation to the Scottish Commission (see section 3(1)(ee)). Provision was made 
at the same time for Welsh implementation reports and a protocol (although interestingly, the 
Lord Chancellor had to agree the protocol before the Law Commission could).5 
But adapting references was the easy part. It left the question of initiation through a programme 
of law reform untouched, and that depended on the approval of the Lord Chancellor. During 
this period, the Welsh Government did seek to open up the question of the programme. But the 
problem was that a plausible mechanism was never clearly enunciated. It was accepted that it 
would be impractical for the Welsh Government to be responsible for a full scale Wales-only 
programme, paralleling the role of the Lord Chancellor in respect of what would become an 
England-only plus un-devolved England-and-Wales programme. The upshot was that the 
Welsh Government reserved its position in relation to the programme for the future, while 
concentrating on the change in relation to references.  
So by this point we have arrived at the current legal position in relation to Welsh Government 
initiation of law reform projects: equality with individual Whitehall departments in making 
references to the Commission: no legal point of entry to the process of the making a programme 
of law reform. 
This new settlement was soon to be put to the test, in the context of the adoption of the 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶V12th Programme of Law Reform. Over the previous period, from about the 10th 
Programme in 2008, programmes of law reform had become comparatively more important as 
a source of law reform projects than references, with greater emphasis on public consultation 
on the content of the programme.  
Consultation opened on the 12th programme in June 2010. Although the consultation was 
public, a significant number of proposals for programme projects come from government 
departments themselves. For the first time in 2010-2011, the Welsh Government set up its own 
internal process to develop proposals for law reform projects. The result was that the Welsh 
Government proposed three projects for inclusion in the 12th programme. As with a 
GHSDUWPHQW¶VSURSRVDOVWKHUHZDVDSHULRGRIGLVFXVVLRQWRH[SORUHDQGUHILQHWKHSURMHFWV,Q
UHVSHFWRIWKH:HOVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VRne in particular changed radically ± that which became 
the project on the form and accessibility of the law in Wales. But the end product was that three 
Wales-only projects made the final cut ± that on the form and accessibility of the law in Wales, 
plus a project on planning law in Wales and a shorter scoping project on environmental law in 
Wales. 
                                                          
5 Law Commissions Act 1965, ss 3C and 3D. 
Once the Commission has decided on its list of projects for the programme, the list is submitted 
to the Ministry of Justice for submission to the Lord Chancellor. A project will not be included 
on the list unless it has the support of the department with policy responsibility for that area of 
law. Naturally, there is also a discussion at this stage with Ministry of Justice officials. It should 
be understood, therefore, that the programme as submitted to the Lord Chancellor will always 
be accompanied by a recommendation from officials that it be approved.  
The Lord Chancellor at the time was Chris Grayling. He approved all of the projects for 
inclusion in the Programme, with the exception of one, the scoping project on environmental 
law in Wales.  
The first point to be made here is that this was an unheard of occurrence. It cannot be claimed 
that anyone has exhaustively researched each programme of law reform, but it was certainly 
unknown in the collective memory of the Law Commission in 2011 for a draft programme 
DJUHHGEHWZHHQWKH/DZ&RPPLVVLRQDQGWKH/RUG&KDQFHOORU¶VRIILFLDOVWREHSDUWO\UHMHFWHG
by the Lord Chancellor personally.  
Secondly, the official reason given for the excision of this project was that it was necessary 
having regard to ³the balancHRIWKHZRUN´RIWKH&RPPLVVLRQ:KDWWKLVmeant was that the 
Lord Chancellor thought that there were too many Wales-only projects. There was no policy 
dispute involved ± DEFRA, the UK Department responsible for environmental law in England, 
was aware of the proposal and had not objected.  
Finally, the Welsh Government was committed to fund all of the projects, so there were no 
resource implications for the UK Government.  
In this situation, it was not realistic to have recourse to the new reference power, and to do so 
was never suggested. In the face of a clear refusal to allow a project to go ahead by the UK 
Government, the Law Commission would certainly not accept such a reference, a fact of which 
the Welsh Government would of course be fully aware. 
But even with this unfortunate outcome, the 12th programme may well turn out to be the high 
water mark of Law Commission engagement with the Welsh devolved institutions. As it has 
turned out, the form and accessibility project, although it significantly over-ran its initial 
timetable, has been generally thought a success and has been broadly accepted by the Welsh 
Government. The planning law project has gone through some significant changes, becoming 
more of a codification project following a scoping paper produced in 2016. A consultation 
paper was published in November 2017, and the project is continuing.  
The 13th programme of law reform consultation opened on 14 July 2016, with a launch in both 
London and Cardiff. The deadline for responses was 31 October 2016. The booklet published 
to inform the consultation process included two suggestions for Wales-only projects. Both 
followed up recommendations in the form and accessibility project. One suggested the 
Commission start on a codification project, proposing either education or local government law 
as the subject matter. The other was a project to develop legislative standards for Wales.  
Publication of the 13th programme was significantly delayed. The expectation was that it 
would be published in July 2017, but with a surprise general election in May 2017, some delay 
was to be expected. Nonetheless, it was only finally published on 14 December 2017.  
During the consultation process, the Welsh Government did not formally propose any projects 
for the programme. The Welsh Government funded the Wales-only projects included in the 
12th Programme of Law Reform, following a practice that had developed particularly since the 
12th Programme in 2011 of central Government departments, other than the Ministry of Justice, 
providing funding for projects they supported within the area of their policy responsibility.  
Despite not including any Wales-only projects, the introduction to the 13th Programme 
included a substantial passage on Wales. The Commission notes discussions with the Welsh 
*RYHUQPHQW³KDYHQRW\HW\LHOGHG´DQHZ:DOHV-only projects, and goes on to say that the 
&RPPLVVLRQ³UHPDLQFRPPLWWHGWRLQFOXGLQJDWOHDVWRQH:DOHV-only project in the Programme 
so we have put aside resources to enable thisDVDQGZKHQDQDSSURSULDWHDUHDRIZRUNDULVHV´
7KLVLVDQH[WUDRUGLQDU\VWDWHPHQWRIWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRODZUHIRUPLQ:DOHV
but equally leads to the surprising conclusion that the Welsh Government has failed to come 
up with an appropriate law reform proposal, even if it is not being asked to fund the project.  
Other projects in the 13th Programme, being undertaken on an England and Wales basis, raise 
devolution issues. It is noteworthy that the Commission has agreed the terms of reference for 
an important project on certain aspects of leasehold property with both the UK Government, 
for England, and the Welsh Government. This is despite the fact that, on the face of it, it may 
raise difficult issues as to whether the subject matter is reserved or not, which may depend on 
detailed consideration of the proposals that are eventually made.6 
Other projects which seem likely to involve devolved areas of law include one on the law 
relating to museum collections, and another on disposing of the dead.  
The extent to which government departments other than the Ministry of Justice are contributing 
to the funding of these projects is not known. But in any event, whether in this programme or 
a future one, it seems likely that we will see a project covering devolved matters but wholly 
funded by a Whitehall department only responsible for the relevant policy area in England. 
What might this say about the future?  
The answer to my first question ± how does the government control of initiation work where 
there are two governments and one law reform agency? ± VHHPVWREH³QRWYHU\ZHOO´. And 
indeed, this may be inevitable, given the asymmetry of the UK devolution settlement, which is 
arguable at its most intense when the focus is on the jurisdictional division of England and 
:DOHV ,Q WKLV MXULVGLFWLRQ WKH 8. *RYHUQPHQW LV DW RQFH WKH ³XSSHU WLHU´ TXDVL-federal 
government for the UK as a whole and the lower tier, operational government for England; 
where England constitutes about 95% of the population of the joint jurisdiction. That the issues 
are fundamentally institutional is perhaps illustrated by the fact that it is difficult to see what 
                                                          
6 dŚĞŵŽĚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ “ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞůĂǁ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐ “ƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ ? ?ŝƐƌĞƐĞƌǀĞĚ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂŶĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞ
modification otherwise does not relate to a reserved matter (Government of Wales Act 2006, Sch 7B, Part 1, 
para 3). Thus, depending on the nature of the proposals, the modification of leasehold law may be for the 
purpose of a non-reserved area of law/policy, such as housing. In this connection, it may be relevant that 
ƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐ ? “ĐŽŶĨĞƌƌĞĚƉŽǁĞƌƐŵŽĚĞů ?ŽĨĚĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ? “ŚŽƵƐŝŶŐ ?ǁĂƐĂĚĞǀŽůǀĞĚƐƵďũĞĐƚ ?^ĐŚ ? ?ƉĂƌĂ
11, now repealed), allowing the National Assembly for Wales to make wholesale reforms to the law of short 
term tenancies (which constitute the same estate in land as long leaseholds) in the Renting Homes (Wales) Act 
2017. It would be surprising if the reserve powers model excluded something that was allowed under the 
conferred powers model (although it has been argued that this is exactly the effect of the legislation in some 
areas, given the approach to conferred powers adopted by the Supreme Court). 
more the Law Commission could itself have done to seek to meet the law reform needs of 
Wales.  
So there must be, from the perspective of the Welsh Government, and indeed the Welsh legal 
community, real doubt as to whether the Law Commission for England and Wales is 
institutionally capable, in the longer term, of addressing the law reform need of Wales.  
The natural response to this is to consider alternative ways for the law reform needs of Wales 
to be met. One possibility is the establishment of a purely Welsh Law Commission. Such a 
proposal was made in WKHFRQWH[WRIWKH:HOVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VUHFHQWVFKHPHWRFUHDWHDGLVWLQFW
Welsh jurisdiction ± a law reform agency being seen as a near-inevitable incident of jurisdiction 
status.7 And it is true that there are a significant number of law reform agencies in jurisdictions 
with a smaller population than that of Wales.8  
However, at least in the absence of jurisdiction status, and even then, unless that is accompanied 
by the devolution of significantly more powers to Wales, there are strong arguments against 
the creation of a standard model Law Commission for Wales. These were set out in detail in 
speeches made by Lord Lloyd Jones in 2012 and 2013.9 Very broadly, given the greater size 
of England and the broader responsibilities of the UK Government, a standing Welsh Law 
Commission on the standard model would inevitably end up exercising a subsidiary role to the 
England-only; or (an alternative model) the England and England-and-Wales Law 
Commission. While it could valuably perform the function of undertaking Wales-only law 
reform, it would constantly be hamstrung by the need to be the Welsh arm of broader law 
reform projects that must extend to the whole jurisdiction, or wider.  
But there is another model of law reform agency well established in parts of the common law 
world which might provide a starting point of a distinctively Welsh model for a Wales-only 
law reform agency. From the founding of the Alberta Law Reform Institute in 1967 to the most 
recent, in South Australia in 2010, an institute model of law reform agency has developed in a 
number of Canadian provinces and Australian states ± it is notable from the Welsh perspective 
that all Institute model agencies currently exist at sub-state level.  
There are considerable differences between the law reform agencies within this wide model, 
but they share some broad characteristics. They are established by agreement between 
stakeholders, not by legislation. The stakeholders typically include the provincial or state 
government, the local professions, and a university. Governance is provided by a board 
composed of the stakeholders, rather than full or part time employed commissioners. Most are 
also housed within the university administratively. They are usually funded from a variety of 
sources, principally governments and the professions, but they may also have project-specific 
funding from not for profit bodies, or grant giving foundations, or even commercial 
stakeholders.  
                                                          
7 March 2016, in response to the process that eventually led to the Wales Act 2017. The draft bill is at 
https://gov.wales/docs/cabinetstatements/2016/160307governmentlawsinwalesen1.pdf. 
8 See Ed R Percival, Changing the Law: A Practical Guide, The Commonwealth and the Commonwealth 
Association of Law Reform Agencies, chapter 10: Law Reform in Small States, available at 
http://www.calras.org/pub/Main/LawReform/Changing%20The%20Law.pdf as a free PDF file or at 
https://books.thecommonwealth.org/changing-law-paperback.  
9 At the Legal Wales Conference, October 2012, https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/lawcom-prod-storage-
11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/2015/05/20121012_Law_Reform_in_a_Devolved_Wales_2012.pdf and #. 
Institutes currently operate in a similar way to standard model commissions, in that they 
constitute the only law reform agency for the relevant jurisdiction, and maintain a standing 
presence with a director and some full time staff. However, it may well be that a specifically 
Welsh variant on the model could provide an adaptable model suited to the unique position of 
Wales in the joint jurisdiction.  
Institutionally based in one of the six Welsh law schools (or, perhaps, supported in a 
collaborative way by all of them), a Welsh Law Reform Institute could maintain a standing 
presence, but adapt its resources to the perceived law reform needs of Wales at any particular 
time. There may be sufficient resources to employ a very small staff permanently, but even if 
there were not, the board, operating essentially on a voluntary basis, could maintain an 
overview of law reform needs; then, when a clearly identified need for a specific Wales-only 
law reform project became apparent, funding could be secured ± perhaps primarily from the 
Welsh Government, but possibly from other sources as well ± on a project-by-project basis. 
Further, if close working relationships were to be developed with the London Law Commission 
(and the Scottish Law Commission for GB or UK projects10), were a project to be undertaken 
on an England and Wales basis in respect of devolved law, provision could be made within the 
context of the joint jurisdiction project for the Welsh Law Reform Institute to input the 
specifically Welsh perspectives and issues via a working relationship with the London Law 
Commission (and similarly the Scottish Law Commission for wider projects). 
,W LV WUXH WKDWGHYHORSLQJVXFKDK\EULGDGDSWDEOHERG\DVRSSRVHG WRD³SURSHU´ VWDQGDUG
Commission, could be seen as continuing the tradition of Welsh exceptionalism in terms of 
devolution that has dogged recent constitutional developments in relation to the country. The 
response to that, however, is that, while constitutional exceptionalism remains, exceptional 
work-rounds will also be necessary.  
The recent history covered by this article shows that, despite the very considerable best efforts 
of the Law Commission itself, the institutional architecture of law reform for Wales in the 
context of the joint England and Wales jurisdiction is lacking. The proposal for a Welsh Law 
Reform Institute suggests one way in which this could be addressed. There may well be others. 
But addressed it should be, for otherwise the very considerable law reform needs of the new, 
emergent polity in Wales will go unmet, to its detriment. And, incidentally, likely to the 
detriment of the England and Wales jurisdiction as a whole.  
                                                          
10 The Northern Ireland Law Commission has been de-funded by the Northern Ireland Department of Justice, 
but has not been ĂďŽůŝƐŚĞĚ ?ĂŶĚĂĐŚĂŝƌŚĂƐĨŽƌŵĂůůǇďĞĞŶĂƉƉŽŝŶƚĞĚ ?/ŶƚŚŝƐ “ǁĂƌŵƐƚŽƌĂŐĞ ?ƐƚĂƚĞ ?ŝƚĐƵƌƌĞŶƚůǇ
provides jurisdictional cover for the UK-wide project on electoral law, which is formally a joint project of the 
three UK Commissions.  
